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Abstract 
 
Unemployment pressures among nationals are emerging in the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) [1]. At a time when a rapidly growing number of young 
nationals are entering the labor force and governments are no longer able to act as employers 
of first and last resort, the non-oil sector continues to rely on expatriate labor to meet its labor 
requirements in most GCC countries. In this environment, policymakers face the related 
challenges of addressing unemployment pressures, while striking a balance between 
maintaining a liberal foreign labor policy and a reasonable level of competitiveness of the 
non-oil sector. Using a matching function framework, this paper examines labor market 
policies that are likely to expand the ability to hire nationals in the non-oil sector. It finds that 
an effective labor strategy should focus on strengthening investment in human capital, 
adopting institutional reforms, and promoting a vibrant non-oil economy. 
 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Labor markets in the member countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the 
Gulf (GCC) are getting tighter, and unemployment pressures are emerging among young 
nationals. High growth in the national or local population during the past decades, together 
with the rising participation of women in the labor force, is translating into a rapidly growing 
supply of nationals seeking employment. Indeed, the local labor force has been growing at an 
average annual rate of 4–5 percent over the past decade, and is likely to continue to grow at 
this pace over the medium term since more than one-third of the local population is below the 
age of 15 years [2]. 
 
Unemployment pressures among nationals have been restrained until recently because most 
GCC governments have been acting as employers of first and last resort. As a result, 
nationals currently constitute most of the workforce in the public sector. This strategy, 
however, has practically reached its limits because the wage bill has become too large to 
keep rising at a time of pressing needs in order to satisfy the demand for government services 
of a young population (Figure 1). The wage bill now represents more than 10 percent of GDP 
in most countries. Thus, the responsibility for job creation in the period ahead is likely to rest 
with the private non-oil sector. This will not be an easy task. During the past three decades, 
a liberal foreign labor policy has allowed the private non-oil sector to rely mainly on 
relatively less expensive, better-trained, and more flexible foreign workers to support its 
development. The result is segmented labor markets as well as a low elasticity of substitution 
between national and foreign workers. 
 
 
   
Against this background, policymakers in the GCC countries need to cast the right balance 
between dealing with the pressures of a rapidly rising local labor force and maintaining a 
flexible policy toward the hiring of expatriate workers. Otherwise, unemployment among 
GCC nationals could rise or the competitiveness of the non-oil economy could be 
compromised. The extent of the problem varies across these countries. Bahrain, Oman, and 
Saudi Arabia face a more pressing challenge than the other countries, given their relatively 
large national workforce. Policies are currently geared toward encouraging the replacement 
of foreign workers with local workers through a combination of mandatory and market-based 
mechanisms, and promotion of non-oil economic growth. 
 
This paper examines policies to address these labor market challenges facing GCC countries. 
To this end, a matching function framework is used that, to our knowledge, has not been 
applied before to GCC countries. The next section reviews the main characteristics of the 
labor market in GCC countries, putting together data from various sources. The third section 
analyzes labor market dynamics and emerging strains, and the fourth section presents current 
policy responses and strategies. The fifth section develops an analytical framework to assess 
current as well as new policies, while the concluding section summarizes the policy lessons. 
 
II.   THE LABOR MARKET IN GCC COUNTRIES 
A.   Demographic Profile 
The population of the GCC countries is relatively small. The total population, including 
expatriates, was estimated at almost 32 million in 2000. Saudi Arabia has the largest 
population, 22 million, while Bahrain and Qatar have the lowest (Table 1). The expatriate 
population is about one-fourth of the total in Saudi Arabia, but accounts for more than 
70 percent of the total in the smaller countries. 
 
High fertility rates over the past decades have translated into high population growth. 
Although these rates have declined from 6.4 births per woman in 1980 to the current rate of 
3.5 births per woman, they remain high by international standards, particularly in Oman and 
Saudi Arabia where they are significantly above the regional average. As a result, the GCC 
population continues to grow at over 3 percent a year [3]. Moreover, a large proportion of the 
population is aged 0 to 14 years, with the average population age ranging between 26 and 
30 years. The dependency ratio (the number of dependents per worker) has also remained 
high, reaching, for instance, 96 percent in Saudi Arabia in 2000 compared to 72 percent in 
other Arab countries. 
 
                                                        Table 1.  Selected Economic Indicators, 2002 
    Overall Fiscal  Total Govt.  
 Nominal GDP Nominal GDP  Balance (In Gross Debt (In Proven Oil 
 (In millions of Per Capita (In Population percent of in percent of Reserves (In 
 U.S. dollars) U.S. dollars) 1/ (In millions) 1/ GDP) 2/ GDP) years) 3/ 
       
Bahrain 8,506 11,619 0.7 0.8 30.3 15 
Kuwait 33,215 15,098 2.2 20.6 32.9 134 
Oman 20,761 7,752 2.7 8.9 17 16 
Qatar 17,321 28,362 0.6 8.3 53.4 15 
Saudia Arabia 188,960 8,567 22.1 -6 97.1 85 
U.A.E. 71,187 19,613 3.6 -9.3 4.5 124 
GCC 339,950 12,026 4/ 31.9 2.2 4/ 66.7 4/ 84 4/ 
       
 
Sources: National authorities; IMF staff estimates 
1/ Including expatriates. 
2/ Includes investment income of government foreign assets. 
3/ Based on current production. 
4/ Weighted average. 
 
 
B.   An Overview of GCC Labor Markets 
A distinguishing characteristic of labor markets in GCC countries is the large share of 
expatriate workers in the labor force. The number of foreign workers in these countries 
increased fivefold from 1.1 million in 1970 to 5.2 million in 2000 [4]. A decade later, the 
United Nations estimates that the expatriate workforce will have risen to about 5.5 million, 
of which 3.7 million will reside in Saudi Arabia. Expatriate workers currently account for 
between 50 percent of employed workers in Saudi Arabia and 90 percent in the U.A.E. 
An initial inflow of foreign workers took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. The oil price 
booms at that time resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for labor to build up the GCC 
countries’ physical and social infrastructure. To satisfy this demand, and in light of the 
relatively small size of local populations, the GCC countries adopted an open door policy to 
foreign labor.  
 
This policy has been maintained through today in all GCC countries—albeit with some 
added restrictions over the years—to support the development of non-oil activities [5]. 
In addition, shortage in skilled national labor has led to continued reliance on foreign labor, 
while contributing to keeping labor costs down. Access to a highly elastic supply of 
expatriate workers at internationally competitive wages and flexible contracts has also 
contributed to avoiding a sharp deterioration in competitiveness of the non-oil sector, usually 
observed in oil (or other natural resource) rich economies [6]. This access has also been 
important to increase the resilience of the GCC economies to terms of trade shocks in the 
context of de facto fixed exchange rate regimes.  
 
Foreign workers are subject to a relatively flexible labor framework. They are hired on 
limited-duration work assignments based on a sponsorship system. This system facilitates 
their hiring and dismissal process by the company that brings them into the country on a 
work contract. Expatriates are attracted to work in the GCC area because their expected 
earnings is higher than in their home countries—most of them currently come from India and 
other Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines [7]. They also benefit from 
subsidized government services, such as energy, education, and health (although they pay 
higher rates than nationals), and lack of income and consumption taxes, enhancing their 
savings opportunities. In fact, in the second half of the 1990s, foreign workers 
have transferred abroad, on average, between 6 and 11 percent of GDP a year, or between 
$2,500–$4,500 per head (Figure 2). 
 
 
 
The continued large expatriate presence in GCC countries is also reflected in a segmentation 
of the labor market in terms of wages, skills, and sectors of employment for national and 
non-nationals. Underlying this segmentation has been the (implicit) guarantee of employment 
in the government sector extended to nationals, who prefer to work in this sector because of 
relatively high wages, job security, social allowances, and generous retirement benefits [8]. 
Moreover, promotion in the government sector is mainly based on seniority rather than 
performance, while relatively shorter working hours than in the private sector (and 
restrictions on foreign investment) have allowed civil servants to run other income-
augmenting endeavors on the side. All these elements have resulted over time in a large gap 
between the private and public sector wage and benefit structures, leading to high reservation 
wages [9]. Consequently, in most GCC countries, except Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, more 
than 60 percent of the national labor force is employed in the public sector, which has also 
absorbed most of the national women entering the labor market over the past decade 
(Figure 3). 
 
In contrast, expatriates work mostly for the non-oil private sector and account, on average, 
for more than 85 percent of total employed workers in that sector. Private employers prefer to 
hire non-national workers because their cost is relatively lower—though the difference in 
cost vis-à-vis national workers is likely to narrow the higher the skill level. Expatriate 
workers are also relatively better trained and have in practice a more flexible contract 
arrangement that facilitates hiring and firing. In addition, their wages are more flexible. 
For instance, in the U.A.E., average nominal wages in local currency in the private sector 
declined by almost 8 percent from 1997–2001, particularly in trade activities. This decline 
probably reflected weak international labor markets following the Asian financial crisis of 
1998 as well as the strengthening of the U.A.E. dirham vis-à-vis currencies in Asia. In 
contrast, government services’ wages increased by 11 percent over the same period, in line 
with domestic inflation. Moreover, private employers are generally reluctant to train national 
workers, who may, at any time, leave the company that has incurred their training cost. 
 
Another aspect of the segmentation is a mismatch in skills supplied by national workers and 
those demanded by the private sector. Although education is free for nationals at all levels, 
the courses offered often do not reflect the requirements of the market. Nationals take 
advantage of this free education with the expectation of guaranteed public employment at 
any level of education and profession. In Qatar, for instance, half of the national workforce in 
the government sector only held a secondary or lower level of education in 1997—the last 
year of available information. Indeed, the majority of university graduates in GCC countries 
pursued studies related to social or religious studies rather than technical fields and business 
administration, where private sector requirements are the greatest. According to the Arab 
Human Development Report (2002), 38 percent of graduates from universities in the GCC 
countries completed studies related to social or Islamic studies, 34 percent in education, but 
only 11 percent in business administration, and 18 percent in technical fields. In addition, 
enrollment at the tertiary (or university) level of education, although it has risen over time, 
has remained low, ranging between 8 percent in Oman and 26 percent in Bahrain and Qatar. 
Enrollment at the secondary level of education has also been surprisingly low—in most GCC 
countries remaining below 70 percent, except in Bahrain, where it reached 94 percent in 
1998. 
 
Another characteristic of labor markets in GCC countries is the limitations to labor mobility. 
With nationals confined in the public sector in most GCC countries, expatriates’ inter-job 
mobility is restrained primarily by the sponsorship system. At the regional level, mobility is 
also limited, even though since the mid-1980s, all GCC citizens have equal rights and free 
mobility to work across GCC countries. This reflects in part the loss in social benefits, 
such as land grants and housing loans that a national worker forgoes by not residing in 
his/her own country. 
 
 
 
III.   EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS: EMERGING STRAINS 
GCC countries have shown some dynamism in employment creation during the 1996–2000 
period. The U.A.E. economy has been the most dynamic, creating, on average, more than 
100,000 jobs a year in that period while the Saudi economy, which is almost four times larger 
than the U.A.E. economy, created 130,000 jobs (Figure 4). The Kuwaiti and Omani 
economies created about the same number of jobs for their nationals, and the Qatari economy 
seemed to have created relatively the lowest number of jobs in the GCC area (although 
information is partial).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sources of employment generation and its beneficiaries have also differed across GCC 
countries. In Bahrain, Oman, and the U.A.E., the majority of the jobs in the past years have 
emanated from the private sector (Figure 5). In contrast, the public sector has continued to 
account for more than three-quarters of employment growth in Kuwait and about half in 
Saudi Arabia. In line with policies in place to encourage the hiring of national workers, these 
workers were the main beneficiaries of job creation in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia 
(Figure 6). In Kuwait and the U.A.E., in contrast, non-nationals reaped a large part of the 
new jobs, probably reflecting their still low levels of unemployment among nationals. In 
Qatar, reform in government ministries and the power sector resulted in a large number of 
non-nationals losing their jobs. Despite this job creation, unemployment pressures seem to 
have increased in the GCC area, affecting in particular first-time job seekers with a primary 
or secondary education. 
 
 
Sources: National authorities and Fund staff estimates 
1/ No information available on Qatar 
2/Government and mixed services only; covering the period 1993-98  
 
   
   
Two main reasons could be advanced to explain these emerging strains in the GCC labor 
markets. First, in some GCC countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, growth of the non-
oil sector has remained weak relative to the rate of growth of the domestic labor 
force. Second, most new jobs in the GCC area have been primarily created in the relatively 
low-skill and low-wage sectors of the private non-oil economy, which continues to have 
access to a plentiful supply of expatriate workers at internationally competitive salaries. 
In fact, most of the new job opportunities created during the second half of the 1990s were in 
trade, manufacturing, and domestic services, which have traditionally not appealed to 
national workers. Job opportunities in the finance sector, which requires relatively more 
skilled workers, have been limited, particularly in the U.A.E., where finance has accounted 
on average for only 1 percent of total jobs created in 1996–2000 (Figure 7). 
 
The employment elasticity (defined as growth in employment in response to non-oil output 
growth) in GCC countries ranged between 0.5 and above 1, compared with international 
averages of less than 0.7 (Figure 8). This relatively high elasticity in some GCC countries is 
consistent with an expansion of employment in the low-skill, low-wage sectors, as mentioned 
above. 
 
The substitution of non-nationals with nationals has also encountered several obstacles. 
First, with most new job opportunities requiring a relatively low level of education and 
paying relatively low wages, the private sector has continued to offer these jobs mostly to 
foreign workers. GCC nationals appear unwilling to accept these positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Moreover, the outputs of the education and training systems are insufficiently compatible 
with labor market requirements, resulting in a skill mismatch. This has hindered the 
substitution of non-nationals working particularly in skilled positions. Although GCC 
countries have made important strides in advancing education, the illiteracy rate remains 
high, and enrollment in secondary and tertiary education remains below enrollment levels 
prevailing in countries with similar per capita income [10]. For instance, in the private sector 
(including public enterprises), 43 percent of Qataris had a tertiary level of education 
compared to 53 percent for expatriates. In the Omani banking sector, the difference was even 
larger, with one-third of nationals having a tertiary level of education compared to 85 percent 
of expatriates (Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Despite emerging strains in the labor markets, the wage expectations of the national new 
entrants in the labor force seem to have remained high and rigid. This reflects in part 
continued expectations by GCC nationals that they will ultimately get a job in the 
government sector, even though this strategy seems to have reached its limits, becoming an 
inefficient social safety net [11]. Indeed, as indicated earlier, the size of the wage bill as a 
share of total expenditures and as a percentage of GDP has risen steadily in most GCC 
countries during the 1990s. However, information on wages in Saudi Arabia shows that over 
the 1997–2001 period, average nominal wages for Saudi nationals in all sectors declined by 
12 percent (compared to almost a 17 percent fall for non-Saudis). This indicates that 
nationals may have started to accept lower entry salaries.  
 
IV.   POLICY RESPONSES AND STRATEGIES 
The GCC countries’ labor policies have evolved over time to take into account changing 
labor market conditions. In the 1980s, GCC governments and state-owned enterprises gave 
priority to nationals in recruitment, resulting in a rapid nationalization of the public sector 
labor force that helped contain unemployment pressures. By the early 1990s, the share of 
nationals had already reached more than 80 percent of the civil service and about half in 
state-owned enterprises in some GCC countries, such as Bahrain (Appendix I). 
 
During the past decade, the focus shifted toward nationalization of the private sector 
workforce. This shift took place because governments realized that they could not 
indefinitely take the lead role in employing national workers. In addition, governments have 
started to demand specialized career stream professionals, such as in education and health, 
because of population dynamics. 
 
To achieve the nationalization of the private sector workforce, a common strategy in GCC 
countries has been to rely on mandatory measures. These include quantitative targets or 
quotas on the proportion of nationals employed by private companies in specific professions 
or sectors (Table 2). Although this strategy has been in place in some GCC countries since 
the early 1990s, the absorption of national workers by the private sector still remains a 
challenge. This challenge reflects practical difficulties to enforce the targets for each and 
every firm, and the private sector’s continued unlimited access to expatriate labor at 
internationally competitive wages [12]. In addition, the GCC authorities have applied quotas 
in a collaborative rather than in a coercive manner, since forced placement of nationals could 
result in lower productivity and increased costs to the employer and the economy, hindering 
long-run growth and ultimately job creation. GCC countries have also relied on 
administrative measures to increase the relative cost of hiring expatriates, such as regulating 
the supply of work permits for foreigners. Other measures include adoption of fees or a 
(training) tax paid by employers to hire foreign workers. Most GCC countries have also 
provided incentives to private employers to hire nationals by rewarding tenders that meet 
quota requirements.  
 
More recently, mandatory and administrative measures have become part of a broader effort 
to simultaneously improve the skills of national workers. In this context, GCC countries have 
adopted market-based strategies, such as improving training and education in line with 
private sector requirements. The GCC authorities are intensifying efforts to eliminate the gap 
between the output of the local educational systems and the requirements of the market and 
to reduce the rates of repetition and dropouts as well as the average number of years invested 
for the graduation of students. They have also attempted to equalize the perceived 
attractiveness of public and private employment by extending retirement benefits 
and social allowances to all nationals independently of the sector that they work for. 
Some GCC countries (notably Oman and the U.A.E.) are currently focusing on encouraging 
self-employment of the national labor force. These efforts have included providing soft loans 
to young nationals who want to start small businesses, as well as offering training in 
partnership with established companies to the private sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that the extent of the labor market challenge differs across GCC countries, the 
implementation and emphasis on the policies and strategies mentioned above have also 
varied from one to another. Qatar, with a relatively small national working age population, 
has been more lenient in implementing nationalization policies, and is currently relying 
mainly on improving training and strengthening education to increase the ability to employ 
nationals in the private sector. The U.A.E. has avoided using quotas, except on the share of 
nationals employed in the banking sector. This sector demands relatively skilled labor and 
pays on average the highest wages in the private sector.  
 
Increasing strains in their labor markets have been also reflected in longer search periods 
after graduation and tightening employment prospects for nationals. The Kuwaiti authorities 
have recently decided to reinforce mandatory limits or quotas for the employment of 
expatriates in the private sector, even though unemployment is officially estimated at less 
than 3 percent. 
 
Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, in contrast, have more forcefully applied quotas to 
promote the nationalization of the labor force. This reflects their relatively larger indigenous 
population and probably relatively higher unemployment rates. In 2001, the Omanization of 
the labor force reached 81 percent and 91 percent of the hydrocarbon sector and commercial 
banks, respectively. In other sectors that require less skilled labor, the progress has been 
modest—reaching, for instance, less than 40 percent of the workforce in the hotel industry.  
 
Limited progress in upgrading the local workforce to meet market requirements and in 
narrowing the remuneration gap, have continued to hinder the hiring capacity of the local 
labor force in the private sector. In addition, given that the majority of the expatriates have a 
low level of education, the nationalization of the labor force through substitution is also 
limited (to probably less than 30 percent of the expatriate workforce). Robust non-oil 
economic growth is not expected to be sufficient to create new jobs for nationals in the 
period ahead. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for instance, the authorities projected in the 
Seventh Development Plan that the Saudi labor force is likely to rise by 817,000 workers in 
the period 2000-04. The Saudiization program is expected to provide about 60 percent of 
new job opportunities, even though private sector real growth is projected to average about 
5 percent per year in that period. Most of the new jobs will likely be created in construction, 
agriculture, trade, and personal services—traditional areas of occupation of expatriate 
workers. The creation of job opportunities for nationals in the private sector therefore 
remains a challenge in GCC countries. 
 
V.   A MATCHING MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT FOR NATIONALS 
The policy responses of the GCC authorities may be formally analyzed in a matching model, 
which is the standard framework for understanding employment dynamics [13]. Such a 
framework allows for an investigation of the incentives and institutions that may affect the 
unemployment outcome in the GCC area. In fact, GCC labor market institutions are different 
from those in Europe and other areas analyzed in the standard literature [14]. Wage 
bargaining, or the sharing of the firm’s surplus, in general, does not apply to the private non-
oil sector in the GCC economies. Firms have access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers 
at internationally competitive wages, and labor unions are absent. As a consequence, workers 
have negligible bargaining power. 
 
This section presents a slightly modified version of the standard matching model 
incorporating elements specific to the GCC area [15]. The focus is on the employment of 
nationals by the private non-oil sector. Therefore, the decisions of nationals in the labor force 
and of firms are explicitly modeled. The employment decisions of the public sector and the 
hiring of expatriate workers are not explicitly modeled, but their impact on national 
employment is captured. 
 
In the model, nationals may either be employed in the private sector or unemployed [16]. 
Being “unemployed” may be interpreted as being “employed” (or expecting to be employed) 
in the public sector. If nationals are employed in the private sector, they receive wages, w. 
They may also receive benefits from the government while employed in the private sector, 
bE, bringing the total compensation to w+bE. Unemployed nationals receive (or expect to 
receive) benefits, bu, which are the public sector wages and benefits. Therefore, bu is the 
reservation wage below which nationals will not accept private-sector employment. 
In other words, to even begin the discussion of the ability of the private sector to employ 
nationals, w+bE > bu.  
 
Firms seek to fill jobs. Each filled job or matched position generates output, y, for the firm 
[17]. The firm pays wages, w, and earns y–w. For the firm to remain competitive, w should be 
less than or equal to y; otherwise, the firm would eventually shut down. If the position is 
vacant, then the firm searches for an appropriate match. In doing so, it incurs a cost, c, which 
depends on, among other things, the ease with which firms can find substitutes, namely, 
skilled or semi-skilled expatriate workers, to fill the position. Suppose that, on average, 
a proportion “s” of existing matches is broken at each point in time; in other words, the 
separation rate is s. When a match is broken, firms pay a separation cost, cs ≥ 0. For higher 
values of cs, separation is more costly for the firm. 
 
Finally, assume that the process of successfully matching job aspirants with vacancies is 
described by a matching function, M = M(U,V), where M denotes the number of successful 
matches, U is the number of unemployed nationals, and V is the number of job vacancies 
posted by firms. Let q ≡ M(U,V)/V denote the probability of filling a vacancy. Define θ ≡ V/U 
as a measure of the tightness of the labor market; as the labor market becomes tighter, 
θ increases. If M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree one, then q is a function of θ: 
q(θ) = M(U,V)/V. Moreover, the probability of an unemployed national finding a job is 
θ q(θ) = M(U,V)/U. 
 
As in the literature, let the matching function be Cobb-Douglas: M = A Uα V1-α, where 
α ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment, and A is the efficiency 
of the matching “technology” or process. Measures that raise A increase the efficiency of the 
searching and matching process and shorten the time to find a match. Such measures include 
information dissemination and, more generally, job search support, including internships and 
the establishment of a national job database. 
 
The unemployment dynamics may now be formally described. In each time period, there is a 
flow of people into unemployment comprised of new entrants into the labor force (young 
nationals, including women) and workers whose private-sector jobs are eliminated. At the 
same time, firms are looking to fill vacancies, and M successful matches are occurring, which 
constitutes the flow out of unemployment. Therefore, the change in unemployment is given 
by: 
1 1( ) ( ) (t t t t t t t tU U N N s N U q ) tUθ θ+ += + − + − − , 
 
where Nt is the number of nationals in the work force at time t. Dividing by Nt, substituting 
for the unemployment rate, ut = Ut/Nt, and re-writing the equation yields: 
 
1(1 ) ( ) [1 ( )]N t N t tg u s g s q utθ θ++ = + + − − , 
 
where gN is the growth rate of the labor force, [s+gN] is the increase in the unemployment 
rate owing to the flow into unemployment, and θ q(θ) u is the decrease owing to the flow out 
of unemployment through successful matches. 
 
The above equation can be solved for the steady state unemployment rate, uss. In the steady 
state, u is constant; uss is given by: 
( )
ss N
ss ss
N
s gu
s g qθ θ
+= + +  
where θss is the steady state value for the market tightness indicator, θ. Note that an increase 
in the labor force growth rate, gN, translates into a higher steady-state unemployment rate for 
a constant level of θ q(θ). Thus, the equation captures the dynamics of emerging strains in 
GCC labor markets owing to demographic pressures. 
 
To complete the characterization of unemployment, a solution for θ is needed. Consider two 
scenarios. In the first scenario, wages are given by the internationally competitive wage, w*, 
for skilled and semi-skilled expatriates. Nationals have no bargaining power since firms have 
access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers at w*. In the second scenario, quantitative 
restrictions on the employment of expatriates give some bargaining power to national 
workers, which lead to wages being determined within the model. 
 
A.   Case 1: No Wage Bargaining 
For the case where private-sector wages are given by w*, the steady state unemployment rate, 
uss, is: 
1 1 1 11 11
1
1 ( ) ( * ) ( )
ss
N s
u
s g A c y w sc r s
1α α αβ− −−
=
+ + − − + α−  
 
and the comparative statistics are: 
( , , , , , *, )ss s Nu u y A s c c w g=
− − + + + + + . 
The unemployment rate is negatively related to output or productivity, y, and matching 
efficiency, A, while it is positively related to the separation rate, s, search costs, c, 
separation costs, cs, and the international wage rate, w*. An increase in y, owing to 
investment in physical and human capital as well as improvements in efficiency (or total 
factor productivity), leads to greater profits and, hence, increased hiring and a lower 
unemployment rate. Similarly, improvements in matching efficiency, A, such as through 
increased information dissemination and job support mechanisms, lead to a greater number 
of matches for a given level of labor market tightness, and hence to a lower unemployment 
rate. 
 
Measures to reduce the separation rate and search costs would also reduce the unemployment 
rate. A lower separation rate results in a lower flow into unemployment. Moreover, reduced 
search costs translate into a higher match rate for a given level of resources that a firm puts 
into searching. Upgrading the skills of the local workforce in line with private sector 
requirements, through educational reforms and vocational training, would reduce the 
separation rate and search costs for appropriately trained national employees. 
 
Lower separation costs, including firing costs, make it less costly for a firm to fire national 
employees as well as hire them. Therefore, labor market reforms that make it easier for firms 
to separate from national workers while at the same time increasing mobility would lower the 
unemployment rate among nationals. In addition, measures lowering costs of hiring 
nationals, including wages, would decrease unemployment. In the model, a drop in the 
international wage rate, w*, increases the profits of the firm for a given revenue level, y. 
Subsidizing the hiring of nationals, through time-specific cash benefits to firms which hire 
nationals, and rewarding tenders that meet quota requirements would enhance profitability.  
 
Mandatory and administrative measures have an ambiguous effect on unemployment. On one 
hand, more vacancies would be created with the need to substitute nationals for expatriates 
[18]. On the other hand, even excluding the impact of these measures on the bargaining 
power and wages of nationals, such measures could reduce output and productivity, y, and 
hence competitiveness, if nationals have lower human capital than skilled expatriate workers. 
Improvements in training and education would alleviate the effect on productivity. 
 
In summary, a policy strategy aimed at increasing physical and human capital investment and 
institutional reform would lower the unemployment rate, u. Investment would increase the 
productivity of the non-oil private sector, y. Institutional reforms, such as through labor 
market reforms, would raise the efficiency of the matching process, A, as well as reduce the 
costs of searching, c, and separation, cs. In addition, investment in human capital would 
likely lower the probability of separation, s. 
 
B.   Case 2: Expatriate Labor Restrictions and Wage Bargaining 
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates result in an increase in 
the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms. As a result, wages are no longer 
determined by the internationally competitive wage, but will be higher. The steady state 
unemployment rate for the case of expatriate labor restrictions is obtained by solving the 
following two equations: 
 
1 1
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
ss
ss ss ss
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u
s g q s g A 1 αθ θ θ− − −= =+ + + +  
 
[1 (1 )]( ) (1 )( )ss ss s E Uc s c A A y sc b
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Although a single closed-form equation cannot be obtained, the comparative statistics are as 
follows: 
( , , , , , , , , )ss s E U Nu u y A s c c b b gφ=
− − + + + + − + +  
The difference with the earlier specification is the endogenous determination of wages 
involving the bargaining power, φ, government benefits to nationals employed in the private 
sector, bE, and government benefits to unemployed nationals, bU. The signs of all other 
variables, the logic, and the policy conclusions remain the same as before. 
 
Greater bargaining power for national workers, reflected in higher values of φ, results in 
higher wages. Given a level of output or productivity, y, higher wages imply lower 
profitability for firms, which translate into lower probabilities of finding jobs and a higher 
unemployment rate. Therefore, in addition to potential negative effects on productivity and 
competitiveness, mandatory and administrative measures could have a deleterious effect on 
national employment by increasing φ. The stronger the measures, the greater would be the 
increase in φ and the more negative would be the effect on employment. Countries that have 
taken strong measures could see a reversal of employment gains unless other measures, such 
as improving training and education and enhancing labor market efficiency, are also swiftly 
implemented. 
 
Reducing the reservation wage of nationals, bU, would lower the private-sector wage for 
nationals and lower the unemployment rate. Moreover, providing greater government 
benefits to private-sector employed nationals, bE, means that workers are willing to accept 
lower wages from firms, which lowers the cost of hiring nationals. Consequently, the firm’s 
surplus increases and the unemployment rate falls. 
 
C.   Simulations 
There is insufficient data to estimate econometrically the above model for the GCC countries. 
In fact, there is insufficient data even to calibrate the model and conduct policy experiments. 
To quantify the impact of the different policy recommendations, we choose a set of baseline 
parameters that we believe are reasonable. We then use these parameters to calculate 
elasticities. 
 
For Case 1, we assume the following parameterization, which yields a steady-state 
unemployment rate of 2.8 percent: 
 
Parameter s gN A α c y w* cs r 
Value 0.25 0.05 1 0.4 0.3 1 0.5 0.3 0.05 
 
The elasticity of steady-state unemployment to changes in each of the variables, y, A, s, c, cs, 
and w*, may be calculated by changing each of the variables by 10 percent and computing 
the new steady-state unemployment rate: 
 
Variable shocked 
New value of 
variable 
New steady state 
unemployment rate 
(In percent) 
Elasticity of unemployment with respect 
to 10 percent change in variable 
(In percent) 
y 1.1 2.1 -26.4  
A 1.1 2.2  -20.7  
s 0.225 2.2  -21.0  
c 0.27 2.4  -14.3  
cs 0.27 2.7  -2.4  
w* 0.45 2.4  -14.9  
 
In other words, a 10 percent increase in y reduces the steady state unemployment rate by 
26.4 percent. Similarly, a reduction in the separation rate, s, by 10 percent reduces the 
unemployment rate by 21 percent. Investment in human and physical capital and institutional 
reforms that enhance productivity in the non-oil sector, y, increase matching efficiency, A, 
reduce the separation probability, s, and lower search costs, c, can be expected to have large 
effects on the unemployment rate. 
 
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates that result in an 
increase in the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms could increase steady 
state unemployment significantly. For Case 2, we use the above parameterization, with the 
following additional assumptions: 
 
Parameter φ bE bU 
Value 0.25 0.2 0.5 
 
These assumptions result in a baseline steady state unemployment rate of 11.3 percent, 
which is substantially higher than the Case 1 steady state rate of 2.8 percent. 
 
The elasticity of steady-state unemployment is calculated as above: 
 
Variable shocked New value of variable
New steady state 
unemployment rate 
(In percent) 
Elasticity of unemployment 
with respect to 10 percent 
change in variable 
(In percent) 
y 1.1 10.3 -9.3 
A 1.1 10.2 -10.0 
s 0.225 10.2 -9.9 
c 0.27 10.5 -6.8 
cs 0.27 11.2 -0.7 
φ 0.225 10.6 -6.6 
bE 0.22 11.1 -2.1 
bU 0.45 10.7 -5.0 
 
 
The elasticity of unemployment to changes in each of the variables is lower in Case 2 than in 
Case 1. That is, the employment response is less when restrictions provide increased 
bargaining power to nationals. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, measures that raise 
productivity of the non-oil sector, improve matching efficiency, reduce the separation rate, 
and lower search costs can have a marked impact on unemployment. Furthermore, less 
reliance on mandatory measures (and, hence, less bargaining power for national workers) and 
lower reservation wages reduce the unemployment rate quite significantly. 
 
D.   Policy Lessons 
To recapitulate, the solution to the emerging labor market strains is closely connected to the 
development of a vibrant non-oil private sector, investment in human capital, and 
institutional reform in the labor market. A vibrant non-oil sector is necessary, although not 
sufficient, to create the needed jobs. Investment in human capital and institutional reform 
will likely facilitate the process of successfully matching local aspirants with jobs. 
The specific lessons from the above discussion are as follows: 
 
Employment Costs 
 
Reducing the relatively high wages in the public sector is likely to lower the reservation 
wage and increase the willingness of nationals to acquire skills or human capital valuable to 
private sector employers. Announcing and enforcing strict limits on public sector hiring is 
likely to further lower the reservation wage by decreasing the likelihood that the public sector 
will act as the employer of first and last resort for nationals. 
Separating wages and social benefits in the public sector, and providing benefits to all 
working nationals—not just to those employed in the public sector—is likely to reduce the 
incentive for nationals to seek public sector employment and lower the reservation wage. 
Furthermore, giving time-specific subsidies for the employment of nationals will likely 
increase private sector demand for them by reducing their employment costs [19]. 
Relatively higher firing costs for nationals, including lengthy appeals and investigation of 
dismissals and direct government intervention, raises their relative cost of employment, thus 
reducing demand. Therefore, establishing a clear set of rules for the appeal of dismissals, 
including fines or penalties associated with wrongful dismissals, and a mechanism for the 
rapid resolution of appeals are likely to lower the relative cost of employing nationals. 
 
Skill Acquisition 
 
Enhancing the human capital of nationals and the acquisition of skills that are valuable to the 
private sector is likely to increase demand and employment. To this end, providing 
education, including vocational training, reforming school curricula, encouraging firms to 
establish internships, awarding scholarships as well as targeted training vouchers, 
and fostering self employment will likely build necessary skills and expertise among 
prospective national workers. 
Investment in Capital and Knowledge 
 
Facilitating the adoption of new technologies and the accumulation of capital is also likely to 
increase private sector demand and employment by raising the productivity of nationals [20]. 
Continued outsourcing of government services and extending 100 percent foreign ownership 
of companies to all non-oil economic activities will likely promote competition and improve 
resource allocation, leading to higher productivity and investment. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Labor market strains are emerging in GCC countries because of a rapidly growing labor 
force. Economic diversification efforts under way address this issue by enhancing non-oil 
growth and in turn job creation. However, these efforts need to be complemented with 
investment in human capital and adoption of institutional reforms in the labor market to 
facilitate the substitution of national workers for expatriate workers without hindering 
employment dynamics and the economy’s competitiveness. 
 
An effective employment strategy for nationals in GCC countries would include: 
• Increasing the relative attractiveness of working in the private sector by lowering the 
wage differential between the public and private sectors; making social benefits 
available to all working nationals; irrespective of sector of employment; and 
announcing strict limits on public sector employment. 
• Reducing disparities in labor mobility by creating a level playing field between hiring 
or firing national workers vis-à-vis expatriate workers. 
• Encouraging skill acquisition among nationals by strengthening educational and 
vocational training, providing time-specific incentives, such as subsidies to 
companies for training and scholarships, and promoting self-employment. 
• Facilitating improvements in productivity and investment in capital by outsourcing 
government services, and extending the possibility of majority foreign ownership in 
the economy. 
• Using price- and market-based rather than quantity-based market interventions to 
encourage the substitution of national workers for expatriate workers and to maintain 
labor market flexibility, which is key to non-oil growth and competitiveness. The 
impact of quantity-based market intervention on employment generation for nationals 
is at best ambiguous. 
Future research on this subject could gather more data to calibrate the model presented above 
and precisely quantify the impact of the different policy recommendations. The model 
presented above could also be developed further to explicitly include the hiring of expatriate 
workers and the degree of complementarities or substitutability between the different skill 
types of expatriate workers and national workers. 
 APPENDIX I 
 
Summary of Current Labor Market Policies in the GCC Countries 
 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
Substitution 
policies in the 
government 
sector 
Public sector 
gives priority to 
nationals. 
Public sector gives 
priority to nationals. 
Public sector gives 
priority to nationals. 
Government intention is 
to increase Omanization 
rate in the public sector to 
95 percent by 2020. 
Public sector gives 
priority to nationals 
with an indicative target 
of 85 percent of Saudis. 
A 1992 
regulation 
requires that 
ministries hire 
expatriates only 
if no national on 
the list of job 
seekers has the 
necessary 
qualifications. 
Quotas on 
expatriates 
Restriction in the 
number of 
approved work 
visas. 
Restriction in the 
number of approved 
work visas. 
Ceilings by region are set 
on the annual influx of 
expatriates. Labor permits 
are issued in priority to 
firms that meet their 
Omanization target. 
Restriction in the 
number of approved 
work visas. 
Restriction in the 
number of 
approved work 
visas. 
Quotas on 
nationals 
Firms are 
requested to 
increase 
employment of 
nationals by 
5 percent a year 
until one-half of 
the labor force is 
Bahraini. 
New 
establishments 
employing 10 or 
more workers 
are required to 
have 20 percent 
Bahrainis in 
their workforce, 
with further 
annual increase 
of 5 percent until 
50 percent is 
reached. 
Firms of less 
than 
10 employees 
must employ at 
least one 
Bahraini other 
than the owner. 
Private sector 
industrial 
establishments are 
required to have 
nationals 
representing at least 
25 percent of their 
labor (Industrial 
Law 6, 1965). 
 
The 2000 Labor 
Market Law 
stipulates the 
proportion of 
Kuwaitis that private 
sector companies 
must have in their 
workforce. This 
varies from sector to 
sector and within 
sectors, depending 
on the size and 
nature of their 
operations. 
Companies that fail 
to meet this target 
would be subject to 
a fine and sanctions. 
Targets were set in 1994 
for the employment of 
nationals by sector. Firms 
with more than four 
employees had two years 
to comply or they would 
be fined an amount equal 
to half the wage bill of the 
workers that should have 
been hired to reach the 
target. Application was 
initially lenient but has 
been tightened recently. 
Firms that do not meet the 
Omanization target of 
their sector are required to 
hire one Omani to get a 
work permit for a new 
expatriate worker. 
Number of nationals 
employed in private 
establishments should 
not be less than 
75 percent of the 
workforce and their 
wages no less than 
51 percent of total wage 
bill (Art. 45 of the 
Labor and Workman 
Law 1969). 
Firms with more than 
20 employees must raise 
the ratio of their Saudi 
workforce by 5 percent 
a year until they reach 
the targets. 
No formal 
targets, except 
on the share of 
nationals 
employed in the 
public 
enterprises and 
the banking 
sector. Banks 
must increase 
their national 
workforce by 
4 percent per 
year until they 
meet the target. 
Firms seeking 
work visas for 
female 
expatriate 
employees 
sponsored by 
their husband or 
father must 
employ an 
additional 
national to get 
the permit. 
Ban to hire 
expatriates in 
certain 
industries 
 Work permit issued 
for foreign workers 
are confined to 
selected activities in 
the private sector 
(1994 Amendment 
107 to Labor Law). 
Ban on expatriates 
performing jobs that do 
not require special 
training programs. 
Sector specific 
restrictions on issuing 
work permits for foreign 
workers. Issuance and 
renewal of work permits 
were stopped in many 
unskilled professions. 
Some job categories, 
such as administration, 
security, and recently 
agricultural products 
trading in the municipal 
market, are reserved for 
nationals. 
 
Fees for use of 
expatriate labor 
Fee on a visa for 
a foreign 
worker. 
Companies with 
more than 100 
workers and do 
not provide 
internal training 
pay a charge for 
training to the 
ministry of labor 
and social affairs 
equivalent to 
1 percent of total 
annual wages of 
the local labor 
force and 
3 percent of 
foreign workers’ 
wages. 
 
 
Fees for visas, work 
permits, and 
residence permits 
were raised. Flat fee 
on hiring domestic 
servants. 
Since 1994, a fee equal to 
7 percent of the worker’s 
annual salary is imposed 
on the use of foreign 
labor. Fee revenues are 
used as “training 
contributions.” 
Fees for visas, work 
permits and residence 
permits. 
Fees for issuing 
a work visa and 
for visa renewal. 
Annual fee 
payable by 
expatriate 
employers of 
household help. 
 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia U.A.E. 
Cash benefits 
and other 
incentives to 
employ nationals 
Payments of up 
to BD 1000 a 
year to midsize 
private 
manufacturing 
firms in which 
30 percent of the 
workforce is 
Bahraini. 
Government 
contracts are only 
provided to 
domestic firms in 
which 40 percent of 
the labor force is 
national, earning at 
least 40 percent of 
the firm’s total wage 
bill. 
Firms that meet their 
Omanization target are 
given priority 
consideration for 
concessionary loans, 
exemptions from duties 
on machinery and raw 
materials, and priority in 
the awarding of 
government contracts. 
Soft finance, tax 
exemptions, and business 
support services are 
offered to nationals who 
create their own business. 
Firms that do not 
comply with the 
Saudiization program 
could be subject to 
refusal of visa requests 
or work permit 
renewals, and could be 
banned from 
government contracts 
bids, loans, and 
subsidies 
 
Education and 
training 
The Bahraini 
Training Center 
has been 
reformed and 
empowered to 
expand publicly-
provided 
training. 
The government has 
initiated several 
steps in the area of 
training to be 
financed by a 
2.5 percent tax on 
companies listed on 
the Kuwait Stock 
Exchange. 
The Vocational Training 
System, financed with the 
proceeds of the fees on 
expatriate labor, ia a 
system of privately-
provided training to 
nationals who must first 
be matched with 
employers that commit to 
hiring them after the 
completion of the 
training. 
Five Year Development 
Plan sets out specific 
targets for general and 
higher education and for 
technical and vocational 
training with the 
establishment of Human 
Resource Development 
Fund. 
Financial support is 
given to firms 
committed to training 
nationals. 
School curricula 
have been 
revised to focus 
on vocational 
training. 
 
Local 
government and 
chambers of 
commerce 
provide training 
and internships 
financed by their 
own resources. 
Enhance private 
sector benefits 
 Extend payment of 
the social allowance 
for Kuwaiti workers 
in the private sector. 
Payment of 
unemployment 
benefits for workers 
until they find a job. 
Initiate the extension of 
the pension scheme to the 
private sector to increase 
its attractiveness. 
 A benefit 
pension scheme 
for nationals in 
the private sector 
was introduced 
in 1999. 
Foreigners are 
subject to higher 
water and 
electricity tariff 
rates. 
Civil service 
retrenchment 
  Reduction in the number 
of civil servants by 13,500 
from 1996-98. 
  
Mobility, 
placement 
Employment 
Service Bureau 
created in 1997 
 Additional flexibility in 
the dismissal legislation. 
Expatriate workers are 
The labor ministry’s job 
matching and placement 
program is currently run 
In 1997, transfer 
of sponsorships 
between 
support, and 
information 
dissemination 
policies 
to handle job 
matching and 
placement 
support for 
Bahraini job 
seekers. 
allowed with the approval 
of their employer to move 
between sponsors, without 
being forced to leave the 
country. 
in 37 regional labor 
offices, with 5 more 
expected to open in 
2000-01 with special 
focus on private sector 
vacancies. 
employers 
became possible 
after one year of 
service subject 
to the approval 
of all parties. 
Enforcement of 
legislation on 
visa 
requirements 
and work 
restrictions 
Recent 
campaign to 
enforce 
immigration law. 
Illegal workers 
are offered a 
grace period to 
legalize their 
stay or leave the 
country. Failure 
to comply would 
result in legal 
action. 
Recent campaign to 
enforce immigration 
law. Illegal workers 
are offered a grace 
period to legalize 
their stay or leave 
the country. Failure 
to comply would 
result in legal action. 
 Recent campaign to 
enforce immigration 
law. Illegal workers are 
offered a grace period to 
legalize their stay or 
leave the country. 
Failure to comply would 
result in legal action. 
Recent 
campaign to 
enforce 
immigration law, 
including that 
expatriates 
should work 
only for their 
sponsor. Illegal 
workers are 
offered a grace 
period to 
legalize their 
stay or leave the 
country. Illegal 
workers can be 
subject to 
imprisonment 
for up to 3 years 
and fined up to 
Dh 30,000. 
Unemployment 
benefits 
 The Manpower and 
Government 
Restructuring 
Program established 
in 2001 will provide 
benefits to Kuwaiti 
nationals. 
   
Source: Updated from Table 3 in Megarbane (2001). 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
A MATCHING MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT FOR NATIONALS IN THE GCC 
ECONOMIES 
Basic Setup 
 
There are two types of agents—national workers and private-sector firms. Nationals either 
are employed by firms or search for employment. Firms with vacancies search for employees 
to fill their vacancies. A filled or a matched position produces output. Matches are broken 
exogenously. 
 
Workers 
 
Suppose that there are Nt nationals in the labor force at time t, and suppose that the national 
labor force is growing at a rate, gN. Workers are identical, infinitely lived, risk neutral, and 
are indexed on the interval [0, Nt]. They have a common discount factor, β = 1/(1+r), where 
r is the world real interest rate. 
 
When employed by a private-sector firm, a worker receives a wage, w. Assume further that 
an employed worker also receives benefits, bE ≥ 0, from the government. Therefore, the total 
compensation of an employed national in the private sector is w+bE. 
 
When not employed, a worker is assumed to have a reservation wage, bu, that reflects the 
benefits and payments received from the government. The higher the benefits and payments, 
the higher the reservation wage. 
 
Firms 
 
Firms employ workers to produce output based on a constant-returns-to-scale technology. 
Assume that one worker, when employed, produces y units of output. The level of output per 
worker, or equivalent labor productivity, depends upon the level of technology (or total 
factor productivity) and capital per worker. Improvements in technology and higher levels of 
capital per worker raise labor productivity and output. Increases in the level of skill 
(or efficiency of the worker), h, also raise output. 
 
When a job is filled, the firm pays the employee, w, and earns, (y – w). When a job is vacant, 
the firm incurs a cost, c, of searching for an employee. If there is a small number of suitable 
nationals, then it may be quite costly for firms to search for them.  
 
Jobs, or matches, are destroyed with probability s; that is, at each point in time, a fraction s of 
employed workers loses their jobs. In other words, s is the given separation rate. When a 
match is destroyed, firms must pay a separation cost, cs. For higher values of cs, 
job destruction is more costly for the firm. 
 
Assume that firms are owned by nationals, which is an appropriate assumption for the GCC 
countries. Consequently, firms have the same discount factor as nationals, β = 1/(1+r). 
 
Matching Function 
 
Successful matches between nationals looking for private-sector employment and firms 
looking to hire workers is given by the matching function, M(U,V), where M denotes the 
number of successful matches, U is the number of unemployed nationals, and V is the 
number of job vacancies posted by firms. Assume that M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree 
one. Let q denote the probability of filling a vacancy, M(U,V)/V. Let θ be a measure of the 
tightness of the labor market, V/U; as the labor market becomes tighter, θ increases. Note that 
since M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree one, q is a function of θ: q(θ) = M(U,V)/V. 
Furthermore, the probability of an unemployed national finding a job is θ q(θ) = M(U,V)/U. 
 
Assume for simplicity, as in the literature, that M = A Uα V1-α, where α ∈ (0,1) is the 
elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment, and A is the efficiency of the matching 
“technology” or process. Measures that raise A increase the efficiency of the process and 
shorten the time to find a match. These measures comprise information dissemination and, 
more generally, job search support, including internships. 
 
Solution of the Model 
 
In each time period, there is a flow of young nationals, including women, entering the work 
force and looking for jobs. Unemployed workers are also looking for jobs. Existing jobs, or 
matches, are being destroyed with probability s. At the same time, firms are looking to fill 
vacancies, and M successful matches are occurring. Therefore, the change in unemployment 
is given by: 
1 1( ) ( ) (t t t t t t t tU U N N s N U q U) tθ θ+ += + − + − −  
 
Dividing by Nt, substituting for the unemployment rate, u = U/N, and rewriting the equation 
yields: 
1(1 ) ( ) [1 ( )]N t N t tg u s g s q utθ θ++ = + + − −  
 
with [s+gN] referring to the increase in the unemployment rate due to the flow into 
unemployment, and θ q(θ) u referring to the decrease due to the flow out of unemployment 
through successful matches. 
 
In steady state, u is constant. The steady state unemployment rate, uss, is 
( )
ss N
ss ss
N
s gu
s g qθ θ
+= + +  
where θss is the steady state value for the market tightness indicator, θ. The impact of an 
increase in labor force growth, gN, implies a rise in steady state employment for a constant 
level of θss q(θss). 
 
To close the model, we need to solve for θss. We do this under two scenarios. The first 
scenario describes the current state in GCC labor markets where, in general, wages may be 
thought of as given by the internationally competitive wage, w*. Workers have no bargaining 
power as firms have access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers at w*. The second 
scenario describes a possible situation where there are quantitative restrictions on the 
employment of expatriates, giving some bargaining power to national workers. 
 
Case 1: No wage bargaining 
 
To solve for θss, consider the firm’s valuation of a filled job and a vacancy. The valuation of 
a filled job, VJ, is given as follows: 
 
( *) [ ( ) (1 ) ].J s V JV y w s c V s Vβ= − + − + + −  
 
In the current period, the firm earns profits of y–w*. In the next period, the match is broken 
with probability s; the firm pays the separation cost, cs, and will have the valuation of a 
vacancy, VV. With probability (1–s), the match will continue and the firm will have the 
valuation of a filled position, VJ. 
 
The valuation of a vacancy, VV, is given by: 
 [ ( ) {1 ( )} ].ss ssV JV c q V q Vβ θ θ= − + + − V  
 
The firm incurs a cost, c, of searching. In the next period, the vacancy is filled with 
probability, q(θss), and the firm will receive a valuation, VJ. With probability, 1– q(θss), the 
vacancy is not filled, and the firm will receive, VV. 
 
The zero profit condition, following from free entry, implies VV = 0, which leaves two 
equations in two unknowns, VJ and θss. The solution for θss and uss are given by: 
1
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The comparative statistics are given by: 
( , , , , , *, )ss s Nu u y A s c c w= g
− − + + + + +  
In other words, the unemployment rate increases with increases in the separation rate, s, the 
cost of searching, c, the wage rate, w*, and the cost of separation (or firing), cs. It reduces 
with increases in productivity, y, and the efficiency of the matching process, A. Therefore, 
lowering the unemployment rate entails enacting measures to increase the productivity of the 
non-oil private sector, y, including through human capital investment, and institutional 
reforms that raise the efficiency of the matching process, A, and reduce the costs of 
searching, c, and of separation, cs. In addition, investment in human capital can lower the 
probability of separation, s, and, hence, the unemployment rate. 
Case 2: Expatriate labor restrictions and wage bargaining 
 
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates lead to an increase in 
the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms. Therefore, wages are no longer 
determined by the internationally competitive wage, but by a bargaining process between 
national employees and firms. 
 
To solve for θss, consider the worker’s valuation of being employed versus being 
unemployed. When employed, the worker’s valuation is given by: 
 
( ) [ (1 )E E UV w b sV s V ],Eβ= + + + −  
 
where VU is the valuation when unemployed. In the current period, the worker receives 
wages and benefits of w+bE. In the subsequent period, the worker becomes unemployed with 
probability s and receives a valuation VU, or remains employed with probability (1–s). 
 
When unemployed, the worker’s valuation is: 
 
[ ( ) {1 ( )}ss ss ss ssU U E UV b q V q Vβ θ θ θ θ= + + − ].  
 
In the current period, the unemployed worker receives payments of bU from the government. 
With probability θssq(θss), the worker finds employment, but remains unemployed with 
probability 1–θssq(θss). 
 
Note that if w+bE < bU, then workers find it more beneficial to remain “unemployed”—at the 
expense of the government. Reducing unemployment, therefore, entails reducing 
“unemployment” benefits or public sector compensation, if the public sector is continuing to 
act as the employer of last resort. 
 
The bargaining process is characterized by Nash bargaining. The total match surplus, S, is the 
sum of the worker’s and the employer’s share: S ≡ (VE – VU)+ VJ, where 
VJ  = (y – w) + ß[s( -c + Vv ) + (1 – s)VJ ] is the firm’s valuation of a filled position [21]. 
It is shared according to the Nash product: 
1
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where φ ∈ [0,1] is the worker’s share of the one-period surplus. Indeed, (VE – VU) = φ S and 
VJ = (1–φ) S. If φ = 0, the firm captures the entire surplus, whereas if φ = 1, the worker 
captures the entire surplus. 
 
 
The solution for w and θss may be derived from the following four equations: 
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The equations may be re-written to show that: 
 
( )ss ( )s E U E Uw y sc c b b b bφ β θ= − + + − − −  
 
Since φ = 0 corresponds to the case of w = w*, φ > 0 implies w > w*. 
 
Further algebra may be used to show that the steady state unemployment rate, uss, is obtained 
by solving the following two equations: 
1 1
1 1
1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
ss
ss ss ss
N N
u
s g q s g A 1 αθ θ θ− − −= =+ + + +  
 
[1 (1 )]( ) (1 )( )ss ss s E Uc s c A A y sc b
αβ θ β φθ β φ β− − + = − − + − b  
 
The comparative statistics are as follows: 
( , , , , , , , , )ss s E U Nu u y A s c c b b gφ=
− − + + + + − + +  
The difference between this specification and the earlier one is the endogenous determination 
of wages. The signs in all other variables remain as before. An increase in the bargaining 
power of nationals, reflected in an increase in φ, raises the wages of nationals at the expense 
of firm profitability. This results in an increase in the unemployment rate. An increase in 
unemployment compensation also raises the unemployment rate by raising the wage at which 
nationals are employed in the private sector. On the other hand, greater government benefits 
to nationals employed in the private sector lowers the unemployment rate because workers 
are willing to accept lower wages from firms, which increases the firm’s surplus. 
 
Endnotes 
 
* The authors wish to thank Edward Gardner, Zubair Iqbal, and Philippe Callier for 
providing comments and useful suggestions on this paper. We also thank Patrick Megarbane 
for letting us reproduce parts of his paper. 
[1] The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
 
[2] Labor statistics in GCC countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)—are scant and vary significantly across countries in terms of 
coverage, quality, measurement, and timeliness. In addition, the data available are incomplete 
because information on military and security personnel is excluded. Statistics on 
unemployment are also not regularly collected. 
 
[3] The United Nations Arab Human Development Report (2002) projects for the GCC area 
a sharp increase in the population aged 0 to 14, from close to 9 million in 2000 to 14 million 
by 2010. 
 
[4] See the United Nations Development Program (2002), Chapter 3. 
 
[5] In the U.A.E., Goyal (2003) estimated that labor growth accounted for nearly one-third of 
non-oil growth in the 1980s, and more than one-half in the following decade. 
 
[6] This phenomenon, know as the Dutch disease, refers to the negative output and 
employment effects caused by an oil (or natural resource) boom on the non-oil sector of the 
economy, particularly exports, leading to an overall contraction in the country’s tradable 
sector. 
 
[7] In the 1970s and 1980s, most expatriate workers were coming from other Arab countries. 
 
[8] In most GCC countries, the retirement age for men is 60 years old and for women 55 
years old, but they can retire with full benefits after 20 years of service. In addition, in all of 
these countries, employee contribution to the pension fund is relatively low (5 percent) or nil 
(Qatar). Expatriate workers are not covered by retirement benefits, but they usually receive a 
month’s salary for every year of service as compensation. 
 
[9] The reservation wage is the threshold wage at or above which national workers would 
decide to supply their labor services and below which they would not. 
 
[10] Illiteracy is mainly concentrated among women and the population aged 40 years and 
above. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, illiteracy among the female population was almost 
29 percent in 2000, while it was less than 3 percent for the population below 29 years. 
 
[11] According to Al-Lamki (2002), in Oman, the remuneration package in the government 
sector for unskilled and semi-skilled work is twice that of the private sector. 
 
[12] In Oman, the target for nationalization of the labor force was only achieved in the 
banking sector (set at 90 percent), reflecting the opportunity provided to nationals through 
education (a banking institute was created in the early 1980s) to acquire the skills required by 
the sector. 
 
[13] Goyal (2003) analyzed national employment in the U.A.E. using a simple labor demand 
and supply model. 
 
[14] The standard literature has primarily examined unemployment dynamics in the context 
of business cycles and the secular rise of unemployment in Europe. 
 
[15] Detailed derivations are provided in Appendix II. 
 
[16] The model follows the setup in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000). 
 
[17] Note that y also denotes average labor productivity. 
 
[18] This would constitute a one-time increase in levels of employment. 
 
[19] The fiscal cost will need to be less than the employment benefit for the policy to be 
welfare improving. These subsidies could be financed, for instance, by fees on skilled 
expatriate workers. 
 
[20] Such investment would increase output and productivity, y, and matching efficiency, A, 
and reduce the separation probability, s, and the cost of search, c. 
 
[21] Recall that the firm’s valuation of a vacancy is V = 0, owing to the zero profit 
assumption. 
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